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Among the many contemporary interpretations of John 
Locke'8 political philosophy, the works of Leo Strauss 1 
and C. B. Macpherson 1 stand out as having been espe-
cially influential, as well as controversial. Both of 
these interpretations maintain that Locke was not a 
natural law theorist, in the traditional sense, and 
that the purpose of his theory of property was to sanc-
tion the unlimited appropriation and accumulation of 
property without concern for the needs of others. 1 
Macpherson concludes, Locke "went out of his way to 
transform the natural right of every individual to such 
property as he needed for subsistence and to which he 
applied his labor into a natural right of unlimited 
appropriation."* Moreover, he claims that one of 
Locke's major achievements was to transform and under-
mine the traditional view of property, which was based 
on the assumption that the earth was originally given 
to mankind in common, in order to justify an individual 
right of appropriation devoid of all moral obligations 
to others in society. 
Both Strauss and Macpherson have argued that 
Locke's account of property .represents the ideology of 
the rising bourgeoisie and is an attempt to provide a 
moral basis for laissez-faire capitalism. Furthermore, 
Macpherson has suggested that the present difficulties 
of modern liberal democratic theory lie in the contra-
dictions inherent in the "possessive individualism" of 
the seventeenth century theorists, like Hobbes and 
Locke. The major problem with these theories, says 
Macpherson, is that they presuppose a modern concept of 
individualism, i.e., a belief that individuals are es-
sentially possessors of rights, freed from all social 
obligations, except for a negative duty of non-inter-
ference, a belief that he claims is ultimately detri-
mental to human and social development. 
In contrast, James Tully* has recently argued that 
Locke's conception of property is not to be understood 
in terms of a right in private property, but only as a 
right to use God's property for God's purposes. "The 
kind of exclusive right which Locke develops," says 
Tully, "is the uniquely English concept of the use 
which a trustee is said to have in another's proper-
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ty."' Accordingly, there is no natural right to the 
appropriation of land in itself, but only an exclusive 
right to use the products of one's labour. Far from 
attempting to provide a moral basis for laissez-faire 
capitalism, Locke's main ideological aim was to demon-
strate "that fixed property in land does not have a 
natural foundation. N T Rather, private property in land 
is a purely conventional right established by govern-
ment and based on mutual agreement. The point of 
departure for Tully's interpretation is the claim that 
Locke was seeking to ground property rights in accord-
ance with traditional natural law theory, which typi-
cally treated private property, not as natural, but as 
a rational addition to the law of nature and as such, a 
product of convention or positive law. 
It is my contention that these interpretations are 
examples of what Monson' calls "nothing but" inter-
pretations, i.e., they make the mistake of reducing 
Locke's theory to one basic principle, instead of 
recognizing the complexity of his philosophical pro-
ject. On the one hand, Locke did propound a social and 
political philosophy which remained firmly rooted in 
traditional natural law theory; on the other hand, I 
will argue that he modified this theory in order to 
defend a natural right in private property. Conse-
quently, if both aspects of Locke's thought are fully 
considered, it can be shown that although Locke does 
justify private appropriation and accumulation beyond 
what is necessary for individual use, this is done, not 
for its own sake, but in order to bring about the con-
ditions of greater productivity and wealth required to 
satisfy the natural law duty to preserve all mankind. 
This duty is correlated with the inclusive right that 
each man has to use those things necessary for his own 
preservation, a right which is prior to any exclusive 
right in property, and is the basis of Locke's own 
conception of an "original community." It is this as-
sumption of an "original community" that establishes 
the natural law parameters for the distribution of 
property within a just society. In particular, any 
individual'8 exclusive right in property is always con-
ditioned by a concommitant obligation to others, as 
determined by the inclusive right each man has to the 
means of self-preservation. What distinguishes Locke 
from a traditional natural law theorist, however, is 
that he also claims that rights in private property are 
completely natural, not conventional. 
For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that 
Locke was neither a disguised Hobbesian nor that he was 
simply hiding behind traditional terminology, but was, 
in fact, a natural law theorist. 9 What I intend to 
demonstrate is how the principles of natural law 
delimit Locke's conception of property, by situating 
property rights within a complex matrix of interrelated 
rights and duties, both positive and negative; and 
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thereby indicate the true intention of Locke's justifi-
cation of a natural right in property. If this project 
is successful, then it can be shown that, contrary to 
the extreme interpretations advanced by some recent 
commentators, Locke's theory of property is better 
suited to a defense of what is typically called social-
welfare capitalism. In a time when the underlying 
values of liberal democratic society are being subject 
to increasing criticism, not to mention confusion, a 
reassessment of what these values really are is not 
without significance. 
I 
Locke begins chapter five of the Second Treatise 
with the supposition that the earth was originally 
given to mankind in common. 1' Given this supposition, 
which is said to be based on both natural law and 
Scripture, the problem is to demonstrate how anyone 
could ever come to have a property in any particular 
thing. Locke*8 purpose, then, is to solve this problem 
by showing "how Men might come to have a property in 
the several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in 
common." (2.25) In the next paragraph, Locke restates 
the problem, adding that since the earth was given to 
mankind in common, no one originally had a "private 
Dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind." (2.26) 
Locke'8 solution, of course, is the labour theory of 
ownership; for whatever a man mixes his labour with, he 
removes from its natural state and makes it his own 
property. 
While most commentators are as anxious as Locke ap-
pears to be to provide an analysis and justification of 
private property, my immediate intention is not to cri-
tique the solution, but to examine the basic supposi-
tion that underlies the problem itself. How does Locke 
understand the proposition that the earth was given to 
mankind in common? Chapter five seems to furnish lit-
tle insight into the content of this proposition. Most 
commentators are equally unenlightening. 1 1 Macpherson, 
for example, merely reminds his reader that the belief 
in an "original community" was the traditional view, 
found in both medieval and seventeenth century Puritan 
theory, and then adds that Locke accepted this position 
only to refute the conclusions usually drawn from it, 
which had made property "something less than a natural 
individual right." 1 1 Although Macpherson is correct in 
observing the traditional character of this view, such 
an observation adds very little to our understanding of 
it, since there was no common consensus amongst natural 
law theorists as to its precise meaning. 
In this section of the paper, I will outline two 
possible interpretations of the proposition that origi-
nally the earth was given to mankind in common. The 
first interpretation is that provided by the late six-
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teenth century Spanish Jesuit, Francisco Suarez, who 
produced one of the best summaries of the political 
philosophy of Neo-Thomism. Samuel Pufendorf, a German 
Protestant, who attempted a reconstruction of natural 
law theory in the latter portion of the seventeenth 
century, will furnish the material for the alternative 
interpretation. This will be followed, in the second 
section, by an attempt to ascertain the interpretation 
which Locke himself must have assumed, and a considera-
tion of how this position would condition his concep-
tion of the right in property. It should be noted 
throughout this discussion that, despite our differ-
ences in interpretation, I am greatly indebted to the 
excellent historical analyses of Locke and other seven-
teenth century natural law theorists recently provided 
by James Tully and Richard Tuck. 4 1 Both of these works 
have established new standards for the understanding 
and appreciation of Locke's philosophical enterprise. 
The notion of an "original community" is defined by 
Suarez in terms of the conception of a subjective right 
(ius). In his De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (1612) 
Suarez presents a two-fold analysis of the concept of a 
subjective right: 
. . . . this name is properly wont to be bestowed 
upon a certain moral power which every man has, 
either over his own property or with respect to 
that which is due to him. For it is thus that 
the owner of a thing is said to have a right 
(ius) in that thing, and a labourer is said to 
have that right to his wages by reason of which 
he is declared worthy of his hire. Indeed, this 
acceptation of the term is frequent, not only in 
law, but also in Scripture; for the law dist-
inguishes in this wise between a right (ius) 
|already established] in a thing and a right to a 
thing . . . 
According to this analysis, a subjective right desig-
nates either that which is rightfully one's own or that 
which is rightfully due to a person. In other words, 
within the conception of a subjective right two senses 
may be distinguished: (1) a right already established 
in a thing (ius in re) and, (2) a right to a thing (ius 
ad rem). The right to a thing may be conceived as a 
morally valid claim to that which is due to a person as 
a matter of justice, but which he does not yet possess. 
The right in a thing is a right in that which morally 
belongs to a person, and which he does, in fact, 
possess. In either case, a person is related to some 
thing in a way that is morally justified, although the 
exact nature of the relationship varies in each case. 
This dual relationship is rooted in the particular 
sense of "justice" as that which renders unto each per-
son that which is his due. 
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Again, it would seem that iua is so understood in 
the Digest in the passage (I.i.10), where justice 
is said to be the virtue that renders to every 
man his own right (ius suum), that is to say, the 
virtue that renders that which belongs to him. 
Accordingly, this right to claim (actio), or 
moral power, which every man possesses with 
respect to his own property or with respect to a 
thing which in some way pertains to him, is 
called iua; and appears to be the true object of 
justice 
Suarez then applies this dual conception of a sub-
jective right to the notion of an "original community n 
which he describes in the following way: "nature has 
conferred upon men in common dominion over all things, 
and consequently has given to every man a power to use 
these things; but nature has not so conferred private 
property rights in connexion with that dominion . . . 
Following Aquinas, he notes that the institution 
of private dominion (exclusive property rights) is not 
opposed to natural law, but is merely a rational addi-
tion to the law of nature, based on human agreement. 1 7 
This is not to say, however, that a positive right to 
property did not exist prior to the division of the 
common stock, for within the "original community" every 
man has a positive right to those things existing in 
common. "Common ownership of property would also per-
tain in a certain sense to dominion held by men by vir-
tue of natural law, if no division of property had been 
made, since [in that case] men would have a positive 
law and a claim to the use of common property 
. . . ."" According to this notion of a "positive 
community," each man has a positive right (ius ad rem) 
to use the things of the earth, a right to his due; a 
right to be included, not excluded, from the use of the 
common stock. Moreover, the (exclusive) right in a 
thing (ius in re) is simply the realization of this 
prior (inclusive) right to one's due (ius ad rem). 
In contrast with this notion of a "positive commu-
nity," Pufendorf suggests a very different view of 
dominion in common, that of a "negative community." In 
his De lure Naturae et Gentium, he argues that the 
"right" of the first man (Adam) over all things was not 
a dominion in the proper sense of the word, but an 
"indefinite dominion not formally established but only 
conceded, not actually, but potentially so." 1' With 
respect to Adam, there was neither private dominion nor 
common dominion, but "indefinite dominion." According 
to this latter notion, "things are said to be nobody's, 
more in a negative than a positive sense; . . . . They 
are, furthermore, called 'things that lie open to any 
and every person'."" 
Pufendorf has, in effect, reduced the notion of 
dominion to that of private property, an exclusive 
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right based on mutual agreement. Since he equates 
"dominium" with "proprietas," common property is than 
referred to as "indefinite dominion" or "negative com-
munity." It is not that the earth originally belongs 
to everyone, each man having a right to use what he 
needs. Rather, the earth belongs to no one, with each 
man having the ability to acquire exclusive property 
rights. 8 1 
The difference between these two conceptions of 
"original community" is subtle, but significant. A 
classic example borrowed from Cicero's On Ends may help 
to illustrate this point. 2 1 If I choose to attend a 
public lecture, the seats in the hall are open to all. 
When I occupy one of the available seats it becomes my 
own, that is, I have an exclusive right to use it and 
others have a negative duty not to interfere with my 
use. . But what is to occur once all of the seats have 
been occupied and there are still others who wish to be 
seated? On Suarez'8 reading of the right to the com-
mon, those remaining still retain their right to be in-
cluded in the use of the hall, even after all of the 
seats have been occupied. If they are to be treated 
justly, i.e. given their due, it would appear that 
those with seats have an obligation or duty to' accomo-
date their claim, in some way. On Pufendorf's reading, 
however, once all of the seats have been occupied, the 
remaining individuals have no positive claim to be in-
cluded in the use of what was previously open to all. 
Those with seats, therefore, have no duty to give them 
their due, although they may attempt to accomodate them 
from feelings of charity. 
I will conclude this section with one last illus-
tration of the significance of "positive community," 
this time taken from Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli ac 
PaciB. 2 1 In this text, Grotius asks whether men in 
general possess any right over things which have 
already become the exclusive property of another. He 
comments that this appears to be a strange question, 
since it would seem that the right of private ownership 
has completely absorbed the right which had its origin 
in the state of community. Responding to this 
question, however, Grotius argues that such is not the 
case, for one must consider that the intention of those 
who introduced private ownership was to deviate as lit-
tle as possible from natural equity. Hence it follows, 
"That in direst need the primitive right of users 
revives, as if community of ownership had remained." 2* 
The reason for this is not based on charity, but 
justice; it rests on the demands of a prior right to 
one's due, for "all things seem to have been dis-
tributed to individual owners with a benign reservation 
in favour of the primitive right." 2' 
The above illustration is based on the assumption 
that Grotius accepted some conception of a "positive 
community." It should be noted, however, that this as-
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sumption is subject to considerable dispute among 
commentators.*' The key to the resolution of this is-
sue is found in an earlier text entitled De lure 
Praedae in which Grotius analyzes the concepts of 
"dominium11 and "proprietas." In this analysis, Grotius 
states that according to the usage of his own day these 
two concepts are identical in meaning, that is, both 
refer to a right of exclusive ownership. Mow if 
Grotius maintained that this usage exhausted the mean-
ing of "dominium" then, like Pufendorf, he would have 
had to reject the notion of a "positive community" with 
"common dominion." However, Grotius goes on to argue 
that: "because of a certain degree of similitude and 
by analogy, the above-mentioned expression descriptive 
of our modern customs are applied to another right, 
which existed in early times."*' According to this 
earlier usage, "dominium" denotes "the power to make 
use rightfully of common property."** In this way, 
natural man, prior to the establishment of exclusive 
property rights, can be said to possess an inclusive 
right to use what is necessary for his subsistence. 
Such a right is analogous or similar to that of an ex-
clusive right. And although this "primitive right" 
seems to have been absorbed by exclusive property 
rights, it can be revived in cases of extreme need. 
Consequently, Grotius appears to be much closer r.o 
Suarez, then to Pufendorf and Hobbes, in advocating 
some conception of an inclusive right to common pro-
perty, at least by analogy. All of them agree, how-
ever, that exclusive property rights are the product of 
convention, based on common consent, and therefore, 
fall under the jurisdiction of positive law. 
II 
As previously stated, Locke assumes a conception of 
an "original community" in his discussion of property 
in the Second Treatise. He does not, however, clearly 
define what this concept means nor does he explicitly 
distinguish between the notions of a positive or nega-
tive community. By a brief examination of Locke's com-
ments on Scripture directed against Filmer in the First 
Treatise, and particularly through an analysis of 
Locke'8 running discussion of natural law in the Second 
Treatise, I intend to show that Locke must have assumed 
the notion of an original "positive community." I will 
then indicate how such an assumption would necessarily 
condition his understanding of the right in property. 
Part of Locke's aim in the First Treatise was to 
refute Filmer*s contention that according to 1 Gen. 28, 
God had granted to Adam (and his successors) the right 
of private dominion over the whole earth, exclusive of 
all other men. Like Pufendorf, Filmer equates dominion 
with private property. But instead of acknowledging 
the existence of an original "negative community" 
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Filmer maintains that Adam was given an exclusive right 
of private property over the earth. To counter this 
claim, Locke argues that whatever dominion Adam had, 
"it was not a Private Dominion, but a Dominion in com-
mon with the rest of Mankind." (1.29) Thus Locke reas-
serts the traditional view of an "original community," 
although he does not state explicitly what sort of com-
munity he has in mind. Various passages, however, tend 
to suggest that he supposed that of a "positive 
community." For instance, this God given common domin-
ion is described in terms of a right to use the pro-
ducts of the earth as a means of self-preservation. 
"God gave his sons a Right to make use of the Earth for 
the support of themselves and Families." (1.37) Again, 
"God . . . himself gave them all a Right, to make use 
of the Food and Rayment, and other conveniences of 
Life, the Materials whereof he had so plentifully 
provided them." (1.41) By admitting a right to use the 
earth, prior to the establishment of exclusive property 
rights, Locke's Scriptural remarks seem, at least, to 
favour the notion of a "positive community." 
Once Locke has shown that common dominion is in 
agreement with Scripture, he must also demonstrate that 
the notion of an original "positive community" is in 
accordance with natural law. Consistent with the tra-
dition of natural law theory, Locke states, in various 
ways throughout the Two Treatises, that the fundamental 
law of nature is that mankind ought to be preserved." 
The validity of this appeal to natural law is not 
justified by Locke, he merely notes that "it is certain 
there is such a Law" and that it is "as intelligible 
and plain to a rational Creature, and a Studier of the 
Law, as the positive Laws of Common-wealths, nay possi-
bly plainer." (2.12) Such a reluctance on the part of 
Locke to undertake a formal defense of natural law 
theory has led some commentators to deny that Locke 
really was a proponent of natural law. The task of 
presenting Locke's credentials as a natural law theor-
ist is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. In 
lieu of such a defense, I will continue to take Locke 
at hi8 word, considering what he actually says, not 
what he may have wanted to conceal by such words. 
According to Locke, "the fundamental law of Nature 
(is) the preservation of Mankind." (2.135) Although 
stated in general terms, such a law or principle is 
meant to serve as a rational rule or guideline which 
directs human activity toward its proper end, and as a 
"law," one is said to be obliged or bound to act 
accordingly." At this level, the end or purpose under 
consideration is the preservation of mankind. By 
reformulating this principle as "all the Members of the 
Society are to be preserved" (2.159) Locke indicates 
that the "end" is to be understood in both its collec-
tive and distributive senses; not only is the human 
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species to be preserved, but each member of that class 
is to be preserved as well. 
Given the general character of this principle of 
action, it is not immediately evident what particular 
activities are morally obligatory in order to guarantee 
that the "end" be achieved. To satisfy this need, 
Locke manages to generate a complex web of interrelated 
rights and duties, thus defining in more detail certain 
types of normative behaviour. 1 1 To begin with, eaqh 
individual is said to have "the right to self-preserva-
tion." (2.11) And as one might expect, this right is 
correlated with the negative duty on the part of others 
not to interfere with the exercise of that right by the 
right holder. In general, "no one ought to harm 
another in his life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions." 
(2.6) Thus far, Locke has said nothing that a typi-
cally "modern" natural rights theorist would find 
objectionable. Locke, however, restates this right of 
self-preservation in terms of a duty, i.e. "every one 
. . . is bound to preserve himself." (2.6) Hence, the 
right of self-preservation is also a duty which obliges 
the individual to preserve himself in existence. It is 
not a right which one is free to exercise or not, for 
no man is at liberty to terminate his own life. 
Locke's translation of the right of self-preserva-
tion into a corresponding duty is justified by the fol-
lowing argument: (1) each man's life is the product of 
God's creative labour. Assuming the labour theory of 
ownership, (2) each man's life is not properly his own, 
but the property of God, its maker. And since (3) no 
man has a right to destroy that which does not belong 
to him, (4) no man has a right to destroy his own life. 
Furthermore, the right not to destroy one's life is 
equivalent to the negative duty that one must not in-
terfere with one's life by destroying it. When viewed 
from the perspective of natural law, this negative duty 
can be transformed into a positive duty: for if the 
law of nature commands that each man be preserved in 
existence and it is morally wrong to act contrary to 
that command, and moreover one is obliged to act ac-
cordingly, then it is also one's positive duty to ac-
tively pursue that end. Consequently, each man has the 
positive duty to preserve his own life. 
In addition to the duty to preserve oneself in be-
ing, every one has a similar duty "to preserve the rest 
of Mankind." (2.6) Locke also refers to this as "the 
Right (each man) has of Preserving all Mankind." (2.11) 
Although Locke does not explicitly explain how this 
duty is derived, it appears to follow from the original 
dictate of natural law, this time from its collective 
aspect. If the end designated by natural law is the 
preservation of all mankind, then one's behaviour must 
be normatively directed toward the realization of that 
end, both positively and negatively. Hence, each man 
has a negative duty not to interfere with the preserva-
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tion of his fellow man, as well as a positive duty to 
promote that preservation, in so far as he is able; 
both duties being designed as a means of preserving 
mankind as a whole. 
To summarize: if the law of nature commands that 
all men ought to be preserved, then all men are equally 
obligated to work toward the realization of that end. 
It has been shown that such an obligation entails a 
complex of normative behaviour defined -in terms of 
rights and duties, both positive and negative, toward 
oneself and others. Anything less would jeopardize the 
fulfillment of this obligation and undercut the funda-
mental law of nature. 
Now, if all men have a right (and a duty) of self-
preservation, then they must also have a right to the 
means of preserving themselves. This right is grounded 
in the right of self-preservation, and implies the 
prior right to use those things necessary for the 
preservation of life. For if. one has a duty to 
preserve one's life, then prior to the actual acquiring 
of some thing, one must already possess a right of ac-
cess to the available means of subsistence. "He that 
is Master of himself, and his own Life, has a right too 
to the means of preserving it . . ." (2.172) In the 
context of the "original community" each man possesses 
the right to use those things necessary for his sub-
sistence (ius ad rem), a right which is prior to any 
exclusive right in a thing (ius in re).** Locke's 
conception of the law of nature, then, appears to sup-
port the notion of an original positive community." 
This returns us to Locke's original problem; to 
show "how Men might come to have a property in the sev-
eral parts of that which God gave to Mankind in 
common." (2.5) Our previous analysis, however, places 
this problem in a clearer light. More specifically, 
since the earth originally belonged in common to all 
mankind, the problem is to show how an individual might 
justly acquire something as his own, without violating 
the common right of other men. Locke's solution to 
this problem seems to be something like the following: 
although the earth and all it contains was given to 
mankind for its use, "yet being given for the use of 
Men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate 
them some way or other before they can be of any use, 
or at all beneficial to any particular Man." (2.26) 
This right to appropriate, Locke derives from what is 
typically called the labour theory of ownership.** 
Since "every Man has a Property in his own Person. 
This no Body has a Right to but himself. The Labour of 
his Body and the Work of his Hands, we may say are 
properly his." (2.27) Consequently, whatever a man 
mixes his labour with, he removes from its natural 
state and makes it his own property. The application 
of one'8 labour, what is exclusively one's own, thus 
transforms an inclusive right to use what is common 
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into an exclusive property right. "The labour that was 
mine, removing them out of that common state they were 
in, hath fixed my Property in them." (2.28) After 
justifying the appropriation of the produce of the 
earth, Locke applies the labour theory of ownership to 
"the chief matter of Property," i.e. the possession of 
the earth itself. "As much land as a Man Tills, 
Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product 
of, so much is his Property. He by his labour does, as 
it were, inclose it from the Common." (2.32) 
What is significant about Locke's solution to the 
problem of individual appropriation is that, in con-
trast with the traditional natural law account, which 
grounded private property in consent, he is careful to 
emphasize that individual appropriation is natural and 
"does not depend on the express consent of all the 
commoners." (2.28) As such, Locke's labour theory is a 
continuation of his refutation of Filmer begun in the 
First Treatise. In this case, he is directly respond-
ing to Filmer's criticism of those natural law theor-
ists who grounded private property in the common con-
sent of mankind.*" 
While the right in property is usually derived from 
the right to self-preservation, it must also be viewed 
in its relationship to the positive duty, not only to 
preserve oneself, but to preserve all of mankind as 
well. Although each man is entitled to that which he 
has justly acquired through his labour, such a right iB 
not absolute. Everyone's exclusive right in property 
is conditioned by the inclusive right that each man 
possesses to use whatever is necessary for his own 
preservation. Exactly what this entails is not immedi-
ately evident. But at least one consequence of this 
inclusive right is that every man has a positive duty 
to render assistance to those in need, while those in 
need have a genuine right to receive such assistance. 
Locke makes this conclusion explicit in the First 
Treatise: 
But we know God hath not left one Man so to the 
Mercy of another, that he may starve him if he 
please: God the Lord and Father of all, has 
given no one of his children such a Property, in 
his peculiar portion of the things of this World, 
but that he has given his needy Brother a Right 
to the surplusage of his Goods; so that it cannot 
justly be denyed him, when his pressing wants 
call for it. And therefore no Man could ever 
have a just Power over the Life of another, by 
Right of property in Land or Possessions; since 
'twould always be a Sin in any man of Estate, to 
let his Brother perish for want of affording him 
Relief out of his Plenty. (1.42) 
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Locke further describes this duty to render assistance 
in terms of the relationship between Justice and 
Charity; 
As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product 
of his honest Industry, and the fair Acguistions 
of hi8 Ancestors descended to him; so Charity 
gives every Man a Title to so much out of 
another'8 Plenty, as will keep him from extream 
want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise 
. . . (1.42) 
In these passages Locke compares the exclusive right 
that each man has to the products of his labour 
(justice), with the inclusive right that each man has 
to use those things necessary for his own preservation 
(charity). Both claims are grounded in the natural law 
dictate that commands the preservation of all mankind. 
Justice requires that property justly acquired is to be 
respected, while charity refers to the "title" each man 
has to the means of subsistence, as well as the cor-
related duty on the part of others to see that this is 
provided, even if it would require some access to what 
one has justly acquired. This is in direct opposition 
to Strauss' assertion that " . . . need as such is not 
a title to property."" For Locke, such a title is 
based on the right to use those things necessary to 
preserve one's life (jus ad rem), a right which" is 
prior to the title derived from one's labour (ius in 
re). To argue that Locke sanctions unlimited accumula-
tion without concern for the needs of others is to deny 
what Locke explicitly says. Moreover, it fails to con-
sider the general theoretical framework within which 
Locke is working. 
The reason why Strauss and Macpherson see Locke as 
justifying unlimited accumulation without concern for 
the needs of others, is that they fail to understand 
Locke'8 theory of property from within the perspective 
of natural law and an original "positive community." 
Since they do not recognize the existence of a positive 
right to property prior to the establishment of indi-
vidual (exclusive) property rights, they cannot see how 
the former has priority over the latter. Consequently, 
they misinterpret the complete significance of Locke's 
initial limitations on private property: (1) use, non-
spoilage (2.31), and (2) leaving as much and as good in 
common for others. (2.27) For while it is correct to 
observe that these initial limits are "transcended" by 
the tacit consent to money, this is not to say that 
they are removed.'' Since money does not spoil, the 
consent to its use does allow the first limitation to 
be transcended. A man is able to accumulate more land 
than he is able to use the products of, since it is now 
possible to exchange the surplus for money which does 
not spoil. This, however, creates the potential for 
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the extension of land-holdings to the point where there 
is no longer any land left to be appropriated—an ap-
parent violation of the second limit. This limit is 
also transcended in that it is replaced by a new stan-
dard of justice which maintains that since the private 
appropriation of land has led to an increase in produc-
tivity and therefore a greater standard of living for 
all, it is a more just arrangement than that which ex-
isted in the "state of nature," wherein land was unap-
propriated. Macpherson warns that "this assumes . . . 
that the increase in the whole product will be dis-
tributed to the benefit, or at least not to the loss, 
of those left without enough land. Locke makes this 
assumption."" But for Locke, this is not merely an 
assumption; it is a moral duty imposed by the law of 
nature. 
Both of the initial limitations on property ac-
quisition were intended to guarantee that the common 
right of all men to the means of subsistence was not 
violated. With the introduction of money, this right 
is not simply denied; it is re-established on a higher 
level. So while it is true that Locke does justify in-
dividual appropriation and accumulation beyond what is 
necessary for individual use, this is done in order to 
promote the conditions of greater productivity and 
wealth required to satisfy the duty to preserve 
mankind. This process of accumulation is grounded in 
the prior supposition that private appropriation is al-
ways conditioned by the inclusive right of each man to 
use what is necessary for self-preservation, as well as 
the correlated duty on the part of others to assist 
those in need. Locke, therefore, has not gone out of 
his way to justify an unlimited exclusive right in 
property for its own sake. Rather, his justification 
is based on the assumption that the right of appropria-
tion, although greatly extended, is always conditioned 
by the prior inclusive right to one's due. In this 
way, the assumption of an original "positive community" 
establishes the parameters for his understanding of 
private property, in accordance with the law of nature. 
Before continuing this discussion, however, an ex-
amination of Tully's conclusions are in order. Contra-
ry to the above interpretation, Tully has suggested 
that Locke's "property in" is not equivalent to 
"private property," but refers to a conditional right 
to use what has been given by God for man's support. 1' 
On this reading, labour does not ground private 
property rights, but merely serves to individuate one's 
inclusive right to the common-stock by transforming it 
into an exclusive, albeit conditioned, use right. 
There is, therefore, no right in land as such, but only 
a use right in improved land conditioned upon the ap-
propriate use of its products in fulfillment of the 
ends established by the law of nature. "This unique 
construction," says Tully, "serves to establish Locke's 
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main ideological conclusion: that fixed property in 
land does not have a natural foundation. "*• Moreover, 
once money is introduced and men are able to enlarge 
their possessions, no appropriation is justified. It 
is not that the initial limitations on appropriation 
are transcended, rather, individual appropriation it-
self is transcended by governmental determination of 
property rights for the common good. The distribution 
of property is then conventional and the consequence of 
man'8 consent to enter political society. 4 1 
Since Locke does not explicitly define what he 
means by "property," it is difficult to determine the 
accuracy of Tully'8 claim that "property in" is merely 
a conditional use right and does not at least approxi-
mate a full right of private ownership, as I have 
suggested. The concept of property rights is, of 
course, a complex notion involving a "bundle of rights" 
which are not always clearly distinguished. 4 8 Locke's 
own running discussion of property rights shares this 
complexity. Nevertheless, it seems evident that 
Locke's notion of property is not easily reducible to a 
"right to use" and nothing more. Even if the primary 
focus of Locke'8 account is to establish (through 
labour) an individual's right to use some thing, it is 
difficult to imagine what such usage would mean if it 
did not imply a right to appropriate or possess that 
thing as well. As we have seen, Locke's right in 
property includes a right to exclude others from use, 
at least when such exclusion is not life threatening. 
(2.6) Locke repeatedly insists that one's property 
cannot be taken without one's consent. He also notes 
that the right in property includes the power of trans-
mi ssibilty, since every man has a right to "the fair 
Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him." (1.42) 
Of course, the distinctive stipulation is that one also 
has a duty to use one's property productively for the 
common good. But I do not see how this condition de-
tracts from the conception of property rights as rights 
of ownership. Rather, it merely adds to the list of 
"rights" a duty of productive use, and there seems to 
be nothing incompatible in holding that owners of pri-
vate property incur a duty to use that property for the 
benefit of society. 4' While this enumeration of 
property rights (and duties) does not constitute a con-
clusive argument against Tully'8 analysis, it does, I 
think, render it somewhat doubtful. 
More importantly, it is not at all clear that Locke 
intended to claim that property rights are completely 
"determined" by government within political society. 
Rather, the role of government is to preserve and regu-
late property for the common good; i.e., in accordance 
with the principles of natural law. (2.45) This is not 
to ignore the fact that not all of Locke's statements 
are perfectly consistent. For instance, he appears to 
conflate this distinction between "determination" and 
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"regulation": "For in Governments the laws regulate 
the right of property, and the possession of land is 
determined by positive constitutions." (2.50) But, as 
I have already argued, Locke's major innovation in tra-
ditional natural law theory was to make property nat-
ural and antecedent to government, while still remain-
ing within a natural law context. The natural founda-
tion or justification of an individual's property is 
his labour, for his labour is "perfectly his own." 
(2.44) And it is the natural condition of human life 
as requiring labour which "necessarily introduces pri-
vate Possessions." (2.35) Nowhere do I find Locke say-
ing that such natural aquisition is eventually invali-
dated, only to be re-established by government. With 
the tacit consent to money, a man is able to enlarge 
hi8 possessions, yet Locke is careful to point out that 
this is not an injustice to anyone, nor does it demand 
the abandonment of natural appropriation, as long as 
this increased wealth is properly used. (2.46) In this 
situation of increasing wealth and diminishing natural 
resources, the task of government is not to invalidate 
the natural process of appropriation, but to guarantee 
that property be used to satisy the natural law dictate 
to preserve all mankind. As always, property rights 
and duties must be understood from within the parame-
ters set by the law of nature. 
The problem now is to ascertain more precisely what 
these parameters are in their application to given con-
crete situations. As previously stated, Locke claims 
that an individual's exclusive right in property is 
conditioned by the inclusive right of those in need to 
use what is necessary for their self-preservation. 
This latter right could take a variety of forms, al-
though Locke does not clearly specify what these forms 
might be. In the First Treatise he simply compares the 
claims of justice and charity, pointing out that each 
generates a "title" to something: the first based on 
the just deserts of one's labour, the second on the 
required satisfaction of one's fundamental needs. In 
the Second Treatise, Locke again repeats these two 
claims, this time in terms of inclusive and exclusive 
right8: 
Now of those good things which Nature hath 
provided in common, every one has a Right (as 
hath been said) to as much as he could use, and 
had a Property in all that he could effect with 
his labour: all that his Industry could extend 
to, to alter from the State Nature had put it in, 
was his. (2.46) 
In neither case does Locke explain how these two 
equally valid moral claims are to be sorted out. It is 
one thing to demonstrate how one's common right to use 
things can be transformed into a property right in some 
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particular thing through labour, and this, of course, 
is Locke's primary concern in the Second Treatise. But 
once most, if not all, of the land has been appropri-
ated; what does one's inclusive right entitle one to, 
how is this right to be satisified, and to whom is this 
right ultimately addressed? 1 will attempt to answer 
each of these questions in turn. 
Thus far it has been determined that an inclusive 
right entitles the right-holder to use what is neces-
sary for the preservation of his life. For Locke, the 
measure of what is necessary is fixed by the conditions 
of life as they exist in the "state of nature," i.e., 
one is entitled to whatever is necessary to preserve 
one'8 life at the (natural) level of subsistence. The 
establishment of this measure is part of Locke's 
overall justification of unlimited accumulation of 
property, even when the results of such accumulation 
are inequalities in holdings. For such accumulation is 
just if and only if the least advantaged individuals 
are benefited or at least are made no worse off than 
they would have been if property had not been 
appropriated. In other words, their standard of living 
is at or above what it would have been in the baseline 
situation of the "state of nature."** It is for this 
reason that Locke observes that an Indian in America, 
where land has not been appropriated,.is worse off than 
a day-labourer in England, where most of the land has 
been appropriated. (2.41) Given this fact, the appro-
priation of land in England is justified, even though 
it did not, in any direct sense, leave as much and as 
good for others. Nonetheless, every individual is 
still entitled, by right, to the means of subsistence. 
Before considering how this right is to be satisfied, 
one further comment is in order. 
Whether or not this minimal (subsistence-level) 
standard would be acceptable to the moral conscience of 
a modern industrialized society is perhaps doubtful, 
although it may have seemed quite obvious to Locke's 
contemporaries. Since standards of living are, for 
practical reasons, dependent upon the real development 
of economic power, the minimally acceptable standard of 
living may also be somewhat relative. In a developing 
economy, for example, one might expect that the least 
advantaged would be increasingly better off. If what 
constitutes "need" cannot be defined in absolute terms, 
but is relative to the levels of social and economic 
development, then "need" could ultimately mean whatever 
is necessary for an individual to enjoy a decent stan-
dard of living as determined by a general moral consen-
sus and available economic resources. In order to meet 
this standard, a variety of redistribution schemes may 
be justified. Finally, I am inclined to believe that a 
similar conclusion is at least implicit in Locke's 
concern, not only for the right to property, but for 
the right to life and liberty as well; for these rights 
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can only be enjoyed effectively under conditions which 
surpass the level of mere subsistence.** 
The right to use what is necessary for the preser-
vation of life may be satisfied in a number of ways. 
In a situation where all the land has not been appro-
priated, individuals could be granted access to what is 
still available. Where most of the land is already 
owned, a variety of options remain open. Locke assumes 
that under such conditions, the opportunities to obtain 
the means to life are greater than they would be in the 
unimproved natural state. Those without land should 
have sufficient opportunities to sell their labour in 
order to obtain the necessities of life. However the 
minimal standard of life is determined, the labourers 
would be entitled to a just remuneration for their ef-
forts. Moreover, those who are unable to obtain their 
own means of subsistence, through no fault of their 
own, are still entitled to whatever is appropriate to 
preserve their lives. This obligation might be ful-
filled by direct transfers of goods or payments to 
those in need. 
Does this mean that one is morally required to give 
up or share what one has justly acquired, either by 
labour or inheritance? In part, this question has al-
ready been answered. One's right to property is never 
absolute, it is always dependent upon the condition 
that one's ownership does not worsen the position of 
others. As we have seen, according to Locke, "charity 
gives every Man a Title to BO much out of another's 
Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he 
has no means to subsist otherwise . . ." (1.42) The 
question now is exactly who has the duty to satisfy 
this right. 
If, as Locke says, individuals in the "state of 
nature" have rights and duties which are derived from 
the moral principles of natural law, and if the "state 
of nature" consists of individuals prior to the estab-
lishment of civil government, then these rights must be 
addresssed to other individuals. Such rights, espe-
cially the right of self-preservation, imply both posi-
tive and negative duties on the part of other men. 
Among the rights which individuals have in the "state 
of nature" is the "executive power" to punish violators 
of the law of nature. Given the obvious difficulties 
in guaranteeing fair judgments in this situation, Locke 
argues that civil government is the proper remedy for 
the inconveniences of the "state of nature." (2.13) 
Now, one might add to the list of inconveniences, 
the problem of guaranteeing that each individual is 
provided with the appropriate means of subsistence. 
For if an individual finds himself in need, then he is 
entitled to assistance from those who have enough. But 
which individual is required to act is subject to a 
variety of contingent factors. In order to be obli-
gated to assist someone in need, one must possess the 
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means of rendering assistance. Furthermore, one is not 
obligated to assist another in need, if the providing 
of aid would reduce the provider to a similar state. 
This condition is in accordance with Locke's claim that 
every one has a duty to preserve himself, and "so by 
the like reason when hia own Preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve 
the rest of Mankind . . ." (2.6) Even if these condi-
tions are met, for practical reasons, one must be in 
some proximate relationship to the needy individual in 
order to be able to provide assistance. If we include 
these factors among the inconveniences of the "state of 
nature," then the remedy for these problems will be 
civil government as well. Consequently, within a given 
society, it is the duty of government to satisfy the 
right that each man has to the means necessary to 
preserve his life. In a just society, organized ac-
cording to the principles of natural law, every indi-
vidual is able to fulfill his respective duty to 
preserve mankind in the most effective manner by the 
redistribution of goods and services, as carried out by 
the operation of appropriate governmental institutions 
and agencies. These obligations would be guaranteed by 
the organization of society, "for the end of Government 
(is) the preservation of all." (2.159) 
If the above analysis is correct, it seems clear 
that Locke's theory of property cannot, without some 
distortion, serve as a moral basis for the ideology of 
bourgeois individualism and laissez-faire capitalism. 
In fact, his theory appears to be more compatible with 
the ideals of social-welfare capitalism, including the 
role of government to redistribute property in order to 
guarantee a decent standard of living for all citi-
zens.** Ironically, Locke's conception of an "original 
community" and the inclusive right of every man to the 
means of self-preservation could serve as a basis for 
some of Macpherson's own arguments concerning the con-
cept of property in a real liberal democracy. Accord-
ing to Macpherson, "the rationale of property . . . re-
quires the recognition of property as a right not to be 
excluded—either the right not to be excluded from a 
share in the society's whole material output, or the 
right not to be excluded from access to the accumulated 
means of labour."* 7 As I have attempted to show, a 
right not to be excluded is already present in Locke's 
own theory and justification of property.** 
NOTES 
'Leo Strauss, Natural Rights and History, (Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 166-251. 
407 
JC. B. Macpherson, The Political Philosophy of 
Possessive Individualism. (Oxford, 1962), pp. 194-262. 
'Strauss, p. 243. It has become commonplace in 
histories of political philosophy to distinguish be-
tween traditional natural law theory and modern natural 
rights theories, i.e. Hobbes and Locke. See especially 
Leo Strauss, The Philosophy of Hobbes, (Chicago, 1952), 
p. xii. 
*C. B. Macpherson, "The Social Bearing of Locke's 
Political Theory," in Life, Liberty, and Property: 
Essays on Locke's Political Ideas, edited by Gordon J. 
Schochet, (Wadsworth, 1971), p. 71. 
'James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke 
- and his Adversaries, (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 95-130. 
'Ibid., p. 122. 
'Ibid., p. 122. 
'Charles Monson, "Locke and His Interpreters," 
Political Studies, 6 (1958), pp. 120-35, reprinted in 
Schochet (1971), p. 33-48. 
'For a discussion of Locke's arguments concerning 
the existence and binding force of natural law see W. 
von Leyden, "John Locke and Natural Law," in Philoso-
phy, vol. 21, (1956), pp. 23-35. For an opposing view 
see Strauss, Natural Rights and History, pp. 204-34, 
and Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law, (Herder Books, 
1947), pp. 88-91. 
"John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, the 
critical edition by Peter Laslett. All selections are 
quoted from this text and noted within the paper. 
"Strauss does not even mention this supposition. 
"Macpherson, The Political Philosophy of Posses-
sive Individualism, pp. 199-200. 
"For a more complete and indepth discussion of the 
history of natural law theories in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights 
Theories, (Cambridge, 1979) and James Tully, A Dis-
course on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries, 
(Cambridge, 1980). 
"Francisco Suarez, De Legibus Ac Deo Legislatore, 
* n Selections From Three Works, translated by G. L. 
Williams, (Oxford, 1944), p. 30. 
"Ibid., p. 31. 
408 
"Ibid., p. 278. 
"Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II, q. 66, a. 
2. "Community of goods is ascribed to the. natural law, 
not that the natural law dictates that all things 
should be possessed as one's own, but because the divi-
sion of possessions is not according to the natural 
law, but rather arose from human agreement, which 
belongs to positive law." 
"Suarez, p. 278. 
"Samual Pufendorf, De lure Naturae et Gentium 
Librl Octo, translated by C. H. Oldfather and W. A. 
Oldfather, (Oxford, 1934), p. 535. 
a ,Ibid., p. 532. 
"This compares favourably with Hobbes: "For where 
there is no commonwealth, there is . . . a perpetual 
war of every man against his neighbor; and therefore 
every thing is his that getteth it,and keepeth it by 
force; which is neither propriety, nor community; but 
uncertainty." Leviathan, chapter 24. 
2'This example is cited by Hugo Grotius, De Jure 
Belli ac P a d s , translation by F. Kelsey, (Oxford, 
1925), p. 186; and by Tully, p. 71. 
"Grotius, p. 193. 
"Ibid., p. 193. 
"Ibid., p. 193. 
"For instance, John Winfrey, in "Charity versus 
Justice in Locke's Theory of Property," Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 43,3, 1981, p. 430, maintains that 
Grotius assumed an original positive community. Tully 
argues that Grotius conceived of the original community 
i'n negative terms, pp. 68-71. And Tuck convincingly 
interprets Grotius position as one which advocates 
what might be called common dominion by similitude or 
analogy, pp. 60-62. I have followed Tuck's interpreta-
tion as the one most clearly supported by the text. 
2'Grotius, De lure Praedae, (trans.) G. L. Williams 
(Oxford, 1950), pp. 226-27. Cited by Tuck, pp. 60-61. 
"Ibid., p. 61. 
"For example: 1.86, 2.6, 2.7, 2.11, 2.16, 2.23, 
2.60, 2.79, 2.135, 2.159 . . . 
"See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, q. 90. 
409 
"This has also been noted by Will mo re Kendall, 
John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule, 
(University of Illinois, 1941), pp. 68-74. 
" I n the First Treatise, Locke appears to make this 
very distinction. While discussing man's right to make 
use of irrational creatures for his own preservation, 
he notes that "thus man's Property in the Creatures, 
was founded upon the right he had to make use of those 
things, that were necessary or useful to his Being." 
(1.86) 
"Again, for a more complete discussion of the 
notion of an original positive community and the deri-
vation of rights and duties in Locke see James Tully, 
especially pp. 53-64. 
"For discussions and criticisms of the labour 
theory of ownership see, for example, Lawrence C. 
Becker, Property Rights; Philosophic Foundations, 
(Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 32-56; or Robert 
Nozick, "Distributive Justice," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 3, (Fall, 1973), pp. 45-126. 
"Filmer writes: "Certainly it was a rare felic-
ity, that all men in the world at one instant of time 
should agree together in one mind to change the natural 
community of all things into private dominion: for 
without such a unanimous consent it was not possible 
for community to be altered." Robert Filmer, 
Patriarcha and Other Political Works, (ed.) Peter 
Laslett, (Oxford, 1949), p. 273. Cited by Tully, p. 
98. 
"Strauss, p. 236. 
"See, for example, Macpherson, p. 203. 
"Ibid., p. 212. Here I am more or less in 
agreement with those who maintain that the condition of 
leaving as much and as good for others is "transcended" 
by the increase in productivity resulting from private 
appropriation. For instance, Alan Ryan, "Locke and the 
Dictatorship of the Bourgeoise," Political Studies 13 
(1965), as reprinted in Schochet (1971), esp. pp. 89¬ 
90; G. Parry, John Locke, (London, 1978), pp. 55-56; 
and, of course, C. B. Macpherson (1962), pp. 211-213. 
"Tully, p. 124. 
"Ibid., p. 122. 
"Ibid., p. 165. 
410 
"See A. M. Honore, "Ownership" in Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, A. G. Guest (ed.) (Oxford, 1961), pp. 
107-47; Becker, pp. 7-23. 
" I t is interesting to note that a similar conjunc-
tion of private ownership and social duty has been a 
central feature of Roman Catholic social thought which, 
like Tully's interpretation of Locke, purports to be 
based on the Thomistic analysis of property and social 
justice. This dual notion is best summed up by the 
statements of Pope John XXIII in Mater et Magistra 
(1961): "private property, including that of produc-
tive goods, is a natural right possessed by all . . . . 
(yet) there is from nature a social aspect to private 
property . . . . (so that) he who uses his right in 
this regard must take into account not merely his own 
welfare but that of others as well." Cited in 
"Property, Private," New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 
II, (McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 849-855. 
"For further discussion on this point see David 
Lyons, "The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to 
Land," Social Theory and Practice, 4,3, (1977), pp. 
249-71. 
"This issue is also discussed by Ramon Lemos, 
Hobbes and Locke: Power and Consent, (University of 
Georgia Press, 1978), pp. 148-53. 
"Ibid., p. 159. 
" C . B. Macpherson, "A Political Theory of Proper-
ty," from Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, re-
printed in Property, Profits, and Economic Justice, 
Virginia Held (editor), (Wadsworth, 1980), p. 216. 
" I am especially grateful to Professors Richard De 
George and Rex Martin for their helpful comments and 
criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors 
which remain are, of course, of my own making. 
411 
